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The ultimate objective of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) is to “prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate 
system”1. This objective can be operationalized by, for example, 
expressing ‘dangerous anthropogenic interference’ (DAI) in terms of 
a global long-term temperature goal (LTTG). However, this trans-
lation depends on world-views; on political, legal and other value 
judgements; and on continuous evaluation2. Scientific assessments, 
such as those by the IPCC, are not in the position to recommend 
specific levels of warming or greenhouse gas (GHG) concentrations. 
Nevertheless, they provide essential information for science-based 
political decisions by outlining the impacts, risks and vulnerabili-
ties, as well as technological, economic and feasibility assessments 
associated with different goals2.
Here we reflect on science and policy aspects relating to the tem-
perature and mitigation goals of the Paris Agreement3. First, we 
give a short history of the emergence of 1.5 °C and 2 °C as limits 
in the policy debate followed by an overview of the current under-
standing of the differences in impact indicators between these two 
warming levels. We then examine the mitigation architecture of the 
Paris Agreement and how it is designed to progressively increase 
mitigation ambition to meet its global LTTG. In this context, we 
assess characteristics of emission pathways from the scientific lit-
erature. Finally, we outline implications for technological require-
ments and near-term action, and discuss elements of a post-Paris 
science agenda.
A short history of temperature goals
The adoption of the LTTG in the Paris Agreement stems from a 
long-standing climate policy debate. In 1996, the EU Environment 
Council was first to identify a global mean temperature (GMT) 
increase of 2  °C above pre-industrial levels as a limit not to be 
exceeded, based on the IPCC’s Second Assessment Report4. 
This was subsequently confirmed by EU heads of government in 
2005 and 20074, mainly informed by the IPCC’s Third Assessment 
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Report (TAR)5 in 2001. Eventually, this ‘not exceed’ limit was taken 
up by the G8 in 20094.
The gradual adoption of specific warming limits by political bod-
ies can be linked to the evolution of the underlying scientific basis. 
Although not comprehensive, progress in the understanding of cli-
mate impacts and their relation to GMT increase might be best illus-
trated by the temporal evolution of the IPCC’s ‘reasons for concern’ 
(RFCs), a framework for aggregating impacts, risks and vulnerabili-
ties that was first developed in 2001  for the TAR5. With scientific 
insights steadily progressing, assessments based on the IPCC’s Fourth 
Assessment Report (AR4)6 and Fifth Assessment Report (AR5)7 have 
identified higher risks for all RFCs at lower temperature levels.
Informed by the conclusions of the IPCC AR48, approximately 
100 countries at the UNFCCC Copenhagen Conference (COP15) in 
2009 were calling for warming to be limited to below 1.5 °C relative 
to pre-industrial levels4,9. Although COP15 itself was widely regarded 
as a failure, two politically durable outcomes from the Copenhagen 
Accord10 have ultimately translated into the Paris Agreement: first 
was the emergence of a long-term goal agreed at head-of-government 
level, expressed then as an aim to hold the increase in warming below 
2 °C, combined with a recognition that deep cuts in global emissions 
are required ‘according to science’. Second, and directly linked, was 
the agreement to review the ‘hold below 2 °C’ long-term goal with 
a view to strengthening it, addressing the 1.5 °C limit called for by 
vulnerable countries.
The hold below 2 °C goal was formally agreed upon in 2010 at the 
COP16 in Cancun and tied to a review of the adequacy of this limit 
with a view to examining 1.5 °C as an alternative11. Although this led to 
little or no reaction in scientific circles, a science-based review process 
under the UNFCCC was established: the structured expert dialogue 
(SED). Based principally on IPCC AR5 science, the SED concluded12 
that the “concept, in which up to 2 °C of warming is considered safe, is 
inadequate” and that “limiting global warming to below 1.5 °C would 
come with several advantages”. At the same time, substantial research 
gaps with regard to 1.5 °C science were identified12.
1Climate Analytics, 10969 Berlin, Germany. 2Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research, 14473 Potsdam, Germany. 3Energy Program, International 
Institute for Applied Systems Analysis, 2361 Laxenburg, Austria. 4Institute for Atmospheric and Climate Science, ETH Zurich, 8092 Zürich, 
Switzerland. 5Environmental Systems Analysis Group, Wageningen University and Research Centre, 6708 PB Wageningen, the Netherlands. 
6Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, Princeton University, Princeton, New Jersey 08544, USA. 7Institute of Physics and 
Astronomy, University of Potsdam, 14476 Potsdam, Germany. 8Lamont-Doherty Earth Observatory, Columbia University, New York 10964-1000, USA. 
*e-mail: carl.schleussner@climateanalytics.org
PERSPECTIVE
PUBLISHED ONLINE: 25 JULY 2016 | DOI: 10.1038/NCLIMATE3096
©
 
2016
 
Mac mill an
 
Publishers
 
Li mited.
 
All
 
ri ghts
 
reserved.
2 NATURE CLIMATE CHANGE | ADVANCE ONLINE PUBLICATION | www.nature.com/natureclimatechange
Climate impacts at 1.5 °C and 2 °C warming
Recent scientific literature allows for an assessment of differences in 
climate projections and impacts at 1.5 °C and 2 °C that goes beyond 
AR5. We do not aim to provide a full review, but use a regional- 
and impact-specific approach to highlight differences for selected 
impacts13 (Fig.  1). All impacts are assessed at a GMT increase of 
1.5 °C and 2 °C above pre-industrial levels. For impact indicators 
that are expressed relative to the 1986–2005 period (with a GMT 
increase of about 0.6 °C above the 1850–1900 average14, our approx-
imation for pre-industrial levels), the results thus relate to a warm-
ing of 0.9 °C or 1.4 °C above the recent past.
The occurrence of hot temperature-related extremes has 
increased robustly over the historical period15,16. As temperatures 
rise, the frequency of hot extremes above a fixed threshold increases 
non-linearly. In a 2 °C warmer world, the global occurrence proba-
bility of a pre-industrial 1-in-a-1000 day extreme temperature event 
is projected to be about double compared to 1.5 °C (ref. 17; Fig. 1a). 
This is about 27 times higher compared to pre-industrial levels and 
more than five times higher than today.
Patterns of precipitation-related changes are considerably more 
uncertain18. Nevertheless, the increase of extreme precipitation 
events due to anthropogenic warming is evident from the obser-
vational record19,20 and the intensity of heavy precipitation events 
is projected to robustly increase globally between a 1.5 °C and 2 °C 
warming21. These changes are particularly pronounced in specific 
regions such as the high latitudes and South Asia (Fig. 1b). Equally, 
the global occurrence probability of a 1-in-a-1000 day extreme pre-
cipitation event is estimated to increase by about 45% (full model 
uncertainty range: 28–70%) at 1.5  °C compared to pre-industrial 
levels and by 65% (41–100%) at 2 °C (ref. 17). Changes in the water 
cycle may be experienced by half of the world’s population at a 
warming of 2 °C (ref. 22).
Contrary to an almost global increase in heavy precipitation 
events, only about 25% of the global land area is projected to expe-
rience substantial changes in dry spell length at 2  °C warming21. 
Projected changes are most pronounced for subtropical regions, 
in particular the Mediterranean. Patterns of change in water 
availability emerge similar to changes in water-cycle extremes23. 
Although global changes are not significant, an increase in total 
water availability is projected for high-latitude regions, as well as 
the South Asian monsoon regions for both a 1.5 °C and 2 °C warm-
ing21. At the same time, water availability is projected to decrease in 
subtropical regions, and most prominently in the Mediterranean, 
where the projected median reduction of at least 9% at 1.5 °C over 
50% of the region’s land area nearly doubles to at least 17% at 2 °C 
(ref. 21; Fig. 1c).
Crop yield projections are subject to considerable uncertainty 
arising from both uncertainty in projections of climate as well as 
crop models24. In addition, many factors affecting crop yield projec-
tions — such as elevated CO2 and ozone concentrations25,26 as well 
as management options27,28, nitrogen limitations29 and the impact of 
heat extremes30 — are not well-constrained and are represented very 
differently across agricultural models31. Observational evidence 
indicates that substantial impacts of extremes on crop yields are 
already evident in the second half of the twentieth century32.
These substantial uncertainties, particularly regarding the effi-
ciency of the CO2 fertilization effect, render a robust differentiation 
between climate impacts on crop yields between 1.5  °C and 2  °C 
difficult. However, using multi-model intercomparison data, some 
general patterns can be identified for the four most common global 
crop types: maize, wheat, rice and soy (Fig. 1f). Although high lati-
tudes may gain, local wheat and maize crop yield reductions are 
projected over the tropical land area (30° S–30° N) at 1.5 °C warm-
ing, with more significant reductions projected at 2 °C (ref. 21). The 
vulnerability of wheat and maize production in tropical regions is 
also evident from a meta-analysis of crop yield projections27. Using 
multi-model ensemble projections that resemble observed yields, 
it is estimated that global wheat production will decrease by about 
6% per °C of warming33. At 1.5  °C and 2  °C warming, local rice 
and soy yields are projected to increase in the tropics compared 
to present-day yields, as the positive effect of CO2-fertilization 
counterbalances the detrimental impacts of climate change in the 
model projections. However, additional gains for warming above 
1.5 °C are limited (compare with Fig. 1f), and reductions are evi-
dent for all crop types for projections that exclude the effects of 
CO2 fertilization21,24.
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Figure 1 | Projected impacts at 1.5 °C and 2 °C GMT increase above pre-industrial levels for a selection of indicators and regions. a, Increase in global 
occurrence probability of pre-industrial 1-in-a-1000 day extreme temperature events17. b, Increase in extreme precipitation intensity (RX5Day) for the 
global land area below 66° N/S and South Asia21. c, Reduction in annual water availability in the Mediterranean21. d, Share of global tropical coral reefs at 
risk of long-term degradation37. e, Global sea-level rise commitment for persistent warming of 1.5 °C and 2 °C over 2000 years44. f, Changes in local crop 
yields for present-day tropical agricultural areas21 (below 30° N/S, model dependent implementation of present day management24). Dashed boxes: no 
increase in CO2 fertilization (No CO2). Panels b, c and f display median changes that are exceeded for over 50% of the respective land areas.
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Table 1 | Paris Agreement elements.
 Element Paris Agreement and/or COP21 Decision language Interpretation and implications 
The long-term 
temperature goal 
(Article 2) and 
related science 
(10/CP.21)
Article 2.1(a): “Holding the increase in the global average 
temperature to well below 2 °C above pre-industrial levels and 
pursuing efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5 °C above 
pre-industrial levels, recognizing that this would significantly 
reduce the risks and impacts of climate change.” 
Paragraph 8, 10/CP.21: “Encourages the scientific community 
to address information and research gaps … including scenarios 
that limit warming to below 1.5 °C relative to pre-industrial levels 
by 2100 and the range of impacts at the regional and local scales 
associated with those scenarios”.
This identifies 1.5 °C as the limit within the LTTG. The expression 
‘holding … well below 2 °C’ is a strengthening of previous language 
and signals an increase in both the margin and likelihood by which 
warming is to be kept below 2 °C compared to holding below 2 °C 
(ref. 11). The probabilities of meeting this limit have substantial 
implications for mitigation pathways under Article 4.1.
The lowest currently available emission pathways tend to exceed 
1.5 °C during the twenty-first century before reaching this limit, or 
lower, by 2100. Whether (and under what conditions) warming can 
be held below 1.5 °C during the twenty-first century is one of the major 
research questions arising from Paris.
The long-term 
global mitigation 
goals (Article 4.1)
“In order to achieve the long-term temperature goal set out 
in Article 2, Parties aim to reach a global peaking as soon as 
possible …, and to undertake rapid reductions thereafter in 
accordance with best available science, so as to achieve a balance 
between anthropogenic emissions by sources and removals by 
sinks of [GHGs] in the second half of this century,”.
Achieving a balance between anthropogenic emissions by sources 
and anthropogenic removals by sinks is equivalent to ‘zero global 
GHG emissions’. The timing of global peaking in emissions and of zero 
emissions, as well as the rate of global emission reductions should 
be consistent with the best available science on technologically and 
economically feasible pathways. Scientific assessments on progress 
towards the long term mitigation goals will be part of the 2018 
facilitative dialogue and the subsequent global stocktake processes. 
The NDC-update 
cycle*
Article 4.3: ”Each Party’s successive [NDC] will represent a 
progression beyond … [its] current [NDC] and reflect its highest 
possible ambition.”
Article 4.9: “Each Party shall communicate a [NDC] every five 
years … informed by the outcomes of the global stocktake.”
The NDCs are at the heart of the Paris Agreement. Communications 
of new NDCs every five years are required to represent a progression 
in terms of mitigation ambition beyond the previous NDCs. 
Global stocktake† Article 14.1: ”The [COP] … serving as the meeting of the Parties to 
this Agreement shall periodically … assess the collective progress 
towards achieving the purpose of this Agreement and its long-
term goals (the ‘global stocktake’) … in the light of … the best 
available science.”
Article 14.2: “The [COP] … serving as the meeting of the Parties 
to this Agreement shall undertake its first global stocktake in 
2023 and every five years thereafter.”
Starting in 2018 with a facilitative dialogue, and continuing with five-
yearly global stocktakes from 2023, the global stocktake process 
should regularly provide a science based aggregate assessment 
of Parties contributions and how these relate to global emission 
pathways consistent with the LTTG and the long-term goals in 
Article 4.1. The link between the NDC cycle and the stocktake 
processes is aimed at understanding the necessary increase in global 
mitigation ambition for it to become consistent with the long-term 
global goals based on the best available science.
Scientific 
information for the 
global stocktake‡
Paragraphs 99, 100 of Decision 1/CP.21: Identify sources of input 
for the global stocktake and advice on how the IPCC can inform 
subsequent global stocktakes.
For the first global stocktake in 2023, paragraph 100 of decision 1/
CP.21 requests advice from a UNFCCC Subsidiary Body (SBSTA) 
on how future IPCC assessments can inform the global stocktake. 
There is an expectation that the IPCC will adjust the timing of its Sixth 
Assessment Report to input into this.
2018 facilitative 
dialogue†
Paragraph 20 of Decision 1/CP.21: “Decides to convene a  
facilitative dialogue … in 2018 to take stock of the collective 
efforts … in relation to progress towards the long-term goal … and 
to inform the preparation of [NDCs],”.
Paragraph 17 of Decision 1/CP.21: “Notes … the estimated 
aggregate greenhouse gas emission levels in 2025 and 2030 
resulting from the intended nationally determined contributions 
do not fall within least-cost 2 °C scenarios … also notes that much 
greater emission reduction efforts will be required … in order to 
hold the increase in the global average temperature to … 1.5 °C 
above pre-industrial levels by reducing to a level to be identified in 
the special report referred to in paragraph 21,”.
Paragraph 21 of Decision 1/CP.21: “Invites the [IPCC] to provide 
a special report in 2018 on the impacts of global warming of 
1.5 °C above pre-industrial levels and related global [GHG] 
emission pathways.”
The role of science and in particular the IPCC to inform the first 
stocktake process (facilitative dialogue in 2018) is laid out in 
COP21 Decisions. Paragraph 21 of Decision 1/CP.21 invites the IPCC 
to prepare by 2018 a special report on 1.5 °C, including on 1.5 °C 
compatible emission pathways. Paragraph 17 then explicitly calls for 
information on the 2025 and 2030 GHG emission levels implied by 
1.5 °C compatible pathways to be provided in this report as guidance 
for much greater emission reduction efforts to be included in NDCs.
The ambition mechanism links the NDC-cycle, the global stocktake, 
and focussed scientific assessments and information. This is essential 
to provide the scientific basis and advice on what is needed to bridge 
the gap between nationally determined near-term ambition reflected 
in NDCs and the collectively expressed long-term goals in the Paris 
Agreement. Thereby, it is the functionality of this mechanism that will 
ultimately determine the Paris Agreement’s success.
Elements of the Paris Agreement3 and its enabling decisions relating to the long-term temperature goal and mitigation architecture (1/CP.21), and related requests to the scientific community (10/CP.21), 
together with our interpretation. This listing is not exhaustive and focuses solely on mitigation-related aspects.  *Articles 4.2, 4.3, 4.4, 4.5, 4.9, 4.11 & 4.19. †Paragraphs 17, 20, 21 of Decision 1/CP.21 and Article 14. 
‡Paragraphs 99, 100 of Decision 1/CP.21.
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Also relevant for global food security, ocean ecosystems appear 
to be particularly vulnerable to anthropogenic GHG emissions due 
to warming, deoxygenation and ocean acidification34. As a result, 
several key risks for oceanic ecosystems are assessed as severe and 
widespread due to climate change at warming levels below 1.5 °C 
(ref.  35). In particular, global coral reef systems are projected to 
be threatened by both ocean acidification and thermal stress36,37. 
Projections indicate that nearly all global warm-water coral reef sys-
tems will be at risk of long-term degradation at 2 °C due to temper-
ature-induced bleaching, unless very optimistic scenarios of coral 
reef adaptation are assumed37. Limiting warming to 1.5 °C reduces 
the fraction of ocean grid cells with reefs under risk of long-term 
degradation based on the frequency of bleaching events (Fig. 1d). 
Similarly, Arctic ecosystems and traditional livelihoods are under 
substantial pressure as sea-ice vanishes — only a warming of well 
below 2  °C may ensure that significant areas of end-of-summer 
sea-ice remain in the Arctic38. A recent extrapolation of observed 
sensitivities of nations’ economic growth to temperature fluctua-
tion indicates substantial negative effects of climate change on the 
global economy (ref. 39). The study identifies differences in impacts 
between 1.5  °C and 2  °C on economic production globally, with 
tropical countries affected most39.
Many impacts of climate change, in particular those related to 
large-scale systems such as ice-sheets and the global oceans, will, 
even under 1.5 °C scenarios, not materialize fully until 2100, but 
rather over centuries and millennia. Prominent examples include 
ocean acidification40, glacier and ice-sheet melting, sea-level rise41,42 
and loss of permafrost43. Model projections, as well as evidence from 
the palaeo-record, indicate multi-millennial global sea-level rise of 
several meters per degree of warming, with contributions from the 
Greenland and partly disintegrated West-Antarctic ice-sheets44,45.
The presented collection of differences in impact indicators 
points towards hot spots of change between 1.5 °C and 2 °C, particu-
larly in tropical regions. These findings tend to support the earlier 
assessments by vulnerable countries that 1.5 °C is a less risky limit 
than 2 °C (ref. 9). The following section will examine the mitigation 
components included in the Paris Agreement and their implications 
for reaching the LTTG.
The Paris mitigation architecture
An interlocking set of articles of the Paris Agreement provides the 
legally binding mitigation ambition architecture of the Agreement46. 
This includes the LTTG in Article 2.1(a), the linked long-term mitiga-
tion goals expressed in Article 4.1, and obligations on Parties to pro-
gressively increase their mitigation ambition to collectively achieve 
these goals. Such an increase over time should be realized through 
successive five-yearly nationally determined contributions (NDCs), 
which are progressively more ambitious and informed by science 
assessments. Table  1 outlines key elements of this legally binding 
mitigation ambition architecture and our respective interpretation.
The LTTG in Article 2.1(a) is operationalized by means of the 
long-term global mitigation goals in Article 4.1. This includes a 
peaking of global emissions as soon as possible, with rapid reduc-
tions thereafter in accordance with the best available science so as 
to achieve “a balance between anthropogenic emissions by sources 
and removals by sinks of greenhouse gases in the second half of this 
century”3. Details of these emission goals are to be determined con-
sistent with the LTTG. The term balance here essentially means that 
globally aggregated anthropogenic GHG emissions are required to 
reach zero.
The ambition level of each individual Party, as expressed in 
each successive NDC, is required to “represent a progression 
beyond the Party’s then current nationally determined contribu-
tion” (Article 4.3)3. This is part of the ambition mechanism under 
the Paris Agreement that additionally includes a five-yearly ‘global 
stocktake’ of the globally aggregated effects of countries’ actions and 
ambitions with regard to the purpose of the Paris Agreement and 
its long-term goals. The first stocktake is to be held in 2023 and is a 
crucial milestone for the Agreement’s effectiveness.
Agreed as part of the enabling COP decisions to commence the 
implementation of the Paris Agreement, a ‘facilitative dialogue’ will 
be held in 2018. It is mandated to assess how the global aggregate 
effect of Parties’ commitments (NDCs) and actions are tracking 
with respect to the long-term global mitigation goals, and to inform 
the preparation and updating of NDCs for 2025 and 2030. The IPCC 
was invited (and has since agreed47) to prepare a Special Report on 
1.5 °C by 2018, specifically including an assessment of this issue, as 
well as on the impacts of warming of 1.5 °C.
The content and timing of the facilitative dialogue and the IPCC 
Special Report on 1.5 °C will be critical in the context of the request 
for Parties to the Paris Agreement to communicate or update their 
NDCs by 2020  so as to increase the level of ambition, both indi-
vidually and in aggregate terms. The results of this process may well 
be the first substantive test of the Paris Agreement’s effectiveness. 
Finally, Decision 10/CP.21 encourages the scientific community to 
conduct research on the gaps identified in the aforementioned SED, 
including on 1.5  °C impacts at regional and local scales and sce-
narios that limit warming below 1.5°C above pre-industrial.
Implications for mitigation pathways
Mitigation pathways in line with different interpretations of the 
Paris Agreement and the respective solution space have not been 
systematically explored so far. The following analysis is based upon 
an ensemble of opportunity of scenarios available in the current lit-
erature. These scenarios are derived by integrated assessment mod-
els (IAMs) and any conclusions drawn should be mindful of the 
assumptions underlying these models48. Furthermore, the classifica-
tion of scenarios applied by us should not be seen as an interpreta-
tion of the Paris Agreement.
Emissions reduction pathways meeting a specific temperature 
limit are most commonly interpreted in terms of the probability 
they imply for staying below such a limit. For example, the hold 
below 2 °C limit has often been assessed in the scientific literature, 
including the IPCC AR5 Synthesis Report49, assuming a greater than 
66% or ‘likely’5 probability of holding the increase in GMT below 
2 °C above pre-industrial levels. Such pathways have a median peak 
twenty-first century warming of, at most, around 1.8 °C (Fig. 2b). 
This is also how we will refer to 2 °C scenarios as a working proxy 
in the text below. Note that the Paris Agreement’s LTTG includes 
a stronger formulation and refers to holding warming ‘well below 
2 °C’3. This signals an increase in both the margin and likelihood by 
which warming is to be kept below 2 °C (Table 1).
Figure  2a shows the joint probability assessments of emission 
pathways for holding warming below 2  °C over the course of the 
twenty-first century, and to below 1.5  °C by 2100 based on emis-
sion pathways from the IPCC AR5 and a more recent review of 
1.5  °C scenarios51. A likely below 2  °C criterion alone (light-grey 
shading Fig.  2a) is insufficient to bring warming below 1.5  °C by 
2100 with a probability of at least 50%. However, if the probability 
of staying below 2 °C increases to more than 80% (dark grey shading 
Fig. 2a), most scenarios assessed would return to below 1.5 °C with 
a probability of greater than 50% before 2100. Such scenarios have 
overshoots of, at most, about 0.2 °C above 1.5 °C during the twenty-
first century (Fig. 2b) and are at present used as proxies for 1.5 °C 
pathways (also in this study). They may, however, not be consistent 
with legal interpretations and political understandings of the Paris 
Agreement LTTG by vulnerable countries and others who see this 
as a not to exceed limit52.
Figure 2b illustrates important linkages between the LTTG and 
the operationalization of long-term mitigation goals in Article 4.1. In 
particular, achieving zero global emissions in the twenty-first cen-
tury is in itself insufficient to ensure that warming is limited to either 
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2 °C or 1.5 °C (black crosses Fig. 2b, as well as Fig. 3 in ref. 53). The 
timing and magnitude of peak global emissions is critical, as this 
plays a major role in determining the cumulative emissions under 
feasible emissions pathways. A goal of zero emissions on its own can 
therefore not be seen as a substitute of the cumulative carbon budget 
approach54,55.
Finally, we extend the available scenarios beyond 2100 by assum-
ing constant 2100 emissions56 to provide a rough estimate of when 
median GMT increase in these scenarios would conceivably return 
to below 1.5 °C. Most 2 °C scenarios assessed would bring warming 
to 1.5 °C (or below) before 2150. Whether such pathways are actu-
ally consistent with the Paris Agreement LTTG is not a scientific but 
a political question.
Technological implications of zero emissions
Achieving the Paris Agreement long-term mitigation goals has direct 
implications for mitigation pathways and technology requirements. 
The vast majority of 1.5 °C and 2 °C scenarios in the current literature 
peak global emissions around 2020  and reach global negative CO2 
emissions in the second half of this century (orange dots in Fig. 2a). In 
these scenarios, negative CO2 emissions in some sectors and geograph-
ical locations are required to compensate for residual GHG emissions 
(non-CO2 and CO2) elsewhere53. Such negative CO2 emissions would 
also allow for a subsequent gradual reversal of warming. However, the 
feasibility of large-scale deployment of negative emission technologies 
is not yet established57 (see ref. 58 for an extensive review of potentials 
and limits of negative CO2 emissions technologies).
Several technologies for achieving negative emissions are being 
discussed58,59. Bioenergy (BE) with carbon capture and storage60 
(CCS) features particularly prominently in present-generation IAMs, 
due to its estimated cost-competitive potential and its positive energy 
balance48,58,61. In the scenarios underlying Fig. 2, BECCS is deployed 
in all scenarios that reach negative CO2 emissions, generally alongside 
considerable uptake through afforestation and reforestation activities. 
BECCS is deployed at a large scale in both 1.5 °C and cost-effective 
likely 2 °C scenarios by the 2040s51, with scaling up of the technology 
typically a few years earlier in 1.5 °C scenarios51. Both scenarios raise 
questions about the attainable speed of technology deployment, links 
to potential agricultural efficiency improvements, climate adaptation 
and increasing food demand62.
In the second half of the twenty-first century, BECCS deployment 
in IAMs reaches levels of bioenergy supply that are close to the lim-
its of sustainable bioenergy supply found in the literature63 (Fig. 3). 
A recent review identified a sustainable technical potential by the 
year 2050 of up to 100 EJ with high agreement across studies, and 
between 100  EJ  and 300  EJ with moderate agreement63.  The same 
review also highlights that deployment beyond 200 EJ could lead to 
high GHG emissions savings, but warns that technological and gov-
ernance preconditions need to be met in order to avoid detrimental 
climate effects, or negative impacts on ecosystems, biodiversity and 
livelihoods63. Regarding the CCS component, total CCS deployment 
in combination with both bioenergy and fossil-fuel powered sys-
tems reaches equal levels of total cumulative CO2 stored by 2100 in 
the available 1.5 °C and 2 °C scenarios (Supplementary Table 1). A 
somewhat larger fraction of total cumulative CCS is associated with 
BECCS in 1.5 °C than in 2 °C scenarios, consistent with the few years 
lead-time scaling up BECCS in 1.5 °C scenarios.
Key differences between 1.5 °C and 2 °C scenarios tend to be related 
to energy efficiency and more rapid near-term reductions51. Also in 
the absence of stringent climate mitigation, the competitive advan-
tages of bioenergy (either in combination or in absence of CCS) com-
pared to fossil fuels can lead to a rapid rise in bioenergy deployment 
over the coming decades (Fig. 3)48. This means that every scenario of a 
sustainable global future must address the real and genuine concerns 
related to large-scale deployment of bioenergy, irrespective of the pres-
ence of mitigation policies. These concerns include biophysically and 
societally acceptable limits of land requirements, in addition to the 
potentially detrimental impacts it might have on food security, and 
water and nutrient availability58,63. However, bioenergy potential does 
not solely relate to arable crops. A substantial potential for agricultural 
and forest residues, as well as organic waste exists58,64 that might help 
to reduce land and resource demand65 and can create additional rev-
enue streams for farmers63. Finally, potential increases in international 
food prices as a result of large-scale bioenergy deployment must be 
put into context with increases following climate change impacts that 
may be substantially larger66. Taken together, we find no conclusive 
evidence that risks to global food security introduced by large-scale 
bioenergy deployment are increasing in 1.5 °C scenarios compared to 
2 °C scenarios (Fig. 3). More science is needed to improve our under-
standing of the climate–food–energy nexus.
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Timing of peak emissions
Whether limiting warming to below 1.5 °C with a probability of at 
least 50% during the entire twenty-first century is technologically 
and economically feasible (and if so, under what conditions) is a 
central question arising from the inclusion of the 1.5 °C limit in the 
Paris Agreement. At present, such scenarios have not been explored 
in the literature on integrated assessment modelling.
When a 2 °C limit is interpreted loosely (allowing for a temporary 
overshoot), clear trade-offs between the near and long term have 
been identified, for example in terms of the timing of peak emis-
sions48,67. This flexibility disappears when aiming for more stringent 
goals such as a hold below 2 °C goal with likely or higher probabili-
ties, a 1.5 °C limit51, or when taking a more precautionary approach 
assuming limited negative emissions potential58,68,69. In addition, any 
delay in mitigation action implies higher costs51,67,69. In 2030, cost-
optimal emissions pathways limiting temperature increase likely 
below 2 °C during the entire twenty-first century, and with greater 
than 50% probability of below 1.5  °C by 2100, show little differ-
ence. Emission trajectories mainly diverge after 2030 (Fig. 4). Such 
pathways are characterized by a peaking of global GHG emissions 
by 2020  at the latest and emission levels of approximately 37–39 
GtCO2e yr-1 in 2030 (refs 68,  70).
Temporal trade-offs are further illustrated by a thought-exper-
iment on pathways limiting warming to below 1.5 °C in this cen-
tury shown in Supplementary Fig.  1. Negative CO2 emissions are 
required in all cases considered. However, peaking global CO2 emis-
sions from industry and energy in 2015, instead of 2030, combined 
with accelerated decarbonization over the next three decades would 
avoid the requirement for very large global negative CO2 emissions.
Currently, successful implementation of all the national emis-
sion reduction proposals that were submitted to the UNFCCC in 
the form of intended nationally determined contributions (INDCs) 
would not result in global GHG emissions peaking before 2030 
(orange ranges in Fig. 4a; ref. 71). The 2030 global GHG emission 
levels implied by the INDCs are far outside the range indicated by 
cost-effective likely 2 °C and 1.5 °C pathways. The situation is even 
less favourable when looking at policies that are currently in place 
(purple ranges in Fig. 4a). This underscores the importance of the 
earlier discussed ambition mechanism (five-yearly NDC cycles 
combined with a global stocktake, see Table  1) for achieving the 
required mitigation target improvements.
A post-Paris science agenda
The use of long-term temperature limits or goals as ‘focal points’ 
to guide climate action is primarily rooted in political risk assess-
ments2,72. As the underlying science is continuously evolving, so 
may the outcomes of such science-based political assessments. The 
inclusion of the 1.5  °C limit in the Paris Agreement following an 
extensive science-policy dialogue12 and replacing in effect the earlier 
2 °C limit, might be seen as an example of this process73.
The Paris Agreement calls for the scientific community to inves-
tigate a 1.5 °C world74,75. In this context, assessments of climate pro-
jections and climate risks need to go beyond global summaries and 
provide detailed information on regional changes at different levels 
of warming13,21,76,77. This is particularly relevant for impacts that may 
in some cases exhibit nonlinearities or even show trend reversals 
with increasing warming78,79.
Furthermore, our understanding of the consequences of peak 
warming and the duration of potential overshoot above 1.5 °C for 
associated climate impacts, as well as the longer term (multi-cen-
tury and millennial) consequences of limiting warming to 1.5 °C, 
needs to be advanced. This is especially relevant for oceanic changes 
such as ocean heat uptake and the resulting sea-level rise, but also 
circulation patterns80,81. Similarly, emission-pathway-dependent 
ocean acidification will leave a century-long legacy in marine envi-
ronments40. Henceforth, the impacts on ocean ecosystems may not 
be easily reversible, even on centennial timescales.
An assessment of abrupt shifts in the climate system in state-of-
the-art climate models under warming scenarios exceeding 10 °C 
and more revealed that about 50% of all abrupt shifts identified 
already occur at 2  °C above pre-industrial levels, compared with 
about 20% at 1.5  °C (ref.  82). Whether, and on what time-scales, 
1.2 1.4 1.6 1.8 2.0 2.2 2.4 2.6 2.8 3.0
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
800
900
1.2 1.4 1.6 1.8 2.0 2.2 2.4 2.6 2.8 3.0
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
400
ba
Projected temperature increase by 2100 relative
to pre-industrial levels (°C)
Bi
oe
ne
rg
y 
co
nt
rib
ut
io
n 
to
 p
rim
ar
y 
en
er
gy
 in
 2
10
0 
(E
J y
r−
1 )
Increasing
sustainability
concerns
Su
st
ai
na
bl
e 
te
ch
ni
ca
l p
ot
en
tia
l
in
 2
05
0 
(m
od
er
at
e 
ag
re
em
en
t)
Su
st
ai
na
bl
e
te
ch
ni
ca
l
po
te
nt
ia
l i
n 
20
50
(h
ig
h 
ag
re
em
en
t)
Projected temperature increase by 2100 relative
to pre-industrial levels (°C)
Bi
oe
ne
rg
y 
co
nt
rib
ut
io
n 
to
 p
rim
ar
y 
en
er
gy
 in
 2
05
0 
(E
J y
r−
1 )
Figure 3 | Absolute contribution of bioenergy to total primary energy supply in literature scenarios with below 3 °C of warming relative to pre-industrial 
levels by 2100. a, Bioenergy contributions to primary energy in 2050 (black dots represent individual scenarios). Sustainable potentials highlighted 
in green and light green are based on ref. 63. b, As with a, but for the 2100 primary bioenergy contribution. A list of all scenarios included is given in 
Supplementary Table 2.
PERSPECTIVE NATURE CLIMATE CHANGE DOI: 10.1038/NCLIMATE3096
©
 
2016
 
Mac mill an
 
Publishers
 
Li mited.
 
All
 
ri ghts
 
reserved. ©
 
2016
 
Mac mill an
 
Publishers
 
Li mited.
 
All
 
ri ghts
 
reserved.
NATURE CLIMATE CHANGE | ADVANCE ONLINE PUBLICATION | www.nature.com/natureclimatechange 7
such shifts in ocean circulation, sea ice, snow cover, permafrost and 
terrestrial biosphere are reversible, will be of great relevance when 
assessing both potential overshoots above 1.5 °C and the longer-term 
effects of a below 1.5 °C limit. Impacts relating to overshoot strength 
and persistence may also relate to the stability of the Greenland and 
Antarctic ice sheets. Recent findings from West Antarctica suggest 
that irreversible marine ice-sheet instability might have already 
been triggered for several basins83–85. Following local disintegration, 
the entire West-Antarctic ice-sheet might be destabilized by already 
observed oceanic warming persisting for more than half a century86. 
Other marine basins in East Antarctica are at a similar risk if minor 
coastal ice volumes are lost87. Although currently observed oceanic 
warming cannot be attributed to climate change with sufficient con-
fidence, twenty-first-century projections indicate substantial circu-
lation changes and subsurface warming around Antarctica88,89. To 
what extent these changes can be related to increases in GMT and 
whether they can be reversed fast enough to avoid irreversible disin-
tegration of these ice-sheets remains an open question.
An improved understanding of these impact-related questions 
is crucial to allow for an integrated comparison with the require-
ments and potential side effects of mitigation pathways. The absence 
of scenarios that have explicitly looked at limiting warming to 
below 1.5  °C during the twenty-first century is an important lit-
erature gap. In addition, emission scenarios generally comply with 
an end-of-century radiative forcing or cumulative emission budget 
constraint90 and are thus not equipped to assess optimal strategies 
to limit peak warming. Alternative pathways and the potential con-
tribution and timing of non-CO2 GHG mitigation also need to be 
taken into account. Current activities under the umbrella of the 
SSP-RCP framework will not remediate these issues, because their 
present approach is methodologically steered towards assessing 
end-of-century outcomes90.
Whether to limit peak, end-of-century or long-term warm-
ing is a political question. Whatever interpretation is made of the 
Paris LTTG, it is clear that a large number of developing and highly 
vulnerable countries view this as a not to exceed 1.5 °C limit52. It is 
important that the scientific community does not overlook this per-
spective by excluding certain outcomes by design. Given the policy 
relevance of these questions and the insights they can provide for 
required near-term mitigation efforts, the scientific community 
should aim to fill this gap in time for the upcoming IPCC Special 
Report on 1.5 °C.
Questions of feasibility, preferences and potential limits of nega-
tive emission technologies are of key relevance for mitigation action 
under the Paris Agreement. To address the full complexity of this 
issue, an integrated analysis of negative emission technologies 
should assess optimal technology portfolios, including environ-
mental, social and economic costs, as well as planetary boundaries91. 
Such an approach would benefit from the integration of other sus-
tainable development goals. It could provide guidance on how to 
minimize or overcome negative side effects of controversial tech-
nologies such as large-scale bioenergy deployment63.
Negative emission technologies including BECCS, and also alter-
native technologies such as enhanced weathering or direct air-cap-
ture58, can be (and often are) included in IAM simulations to reach 
ambitious mitigation goals. At the same time, knowledge on the 
technical feasibility of large-scale deployment of these technologies 
is limited58. Only enhancing their political profile — for example, in 
countries’ climate change mitigation strategies and channelling of 
investments towards these technologies — will allow for the neces-
sary innovation and development beyond their current, preliminary 
stage92. This is a prerequisite for reducing uncertainties about tech-
nology feasibility and applicability, and for improving estimates of 
negative emission potentials.
Finally, the clear inconsistency between the long-term goals in the 
Paris Agreement and near-term mitigation ambition as expressed in 
current INDCs needs to be addressed in a solution-oriented man-
ner. Scientific assessments of the potential for increasing ambition 
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at the national level93 — as well as implications for technology 
investments — will benefit this process. This is especially the case 
for currently installed and planned unmitigated coal-fired power 
generation capacities94 that are inconsistent even with a well below 
2 °C limit95. Furthermore, assessments of increased near-term ambi-
tion will benefit from a comprehensive approach including potential 
negative side-effects as well as near-term benefits, such as energy 
security or reduced air pollution96,97.
The IPCC Special Report on 1.5 °C in 2018, and the emerging 
research it is based upon, are in a very good position to address 
many of these issues98, as they would be timely to inform the ‘facili-
tative dialogue’ on the NDCs in the same year. An integrated assess-
ment of what 2025 and 2030 emission levels would entail with 
regard to long-term warming goals, impacts, potential overshoots, 
as well as technological needs, is key to providing scientific guid-
ance to this process, thereby facilitating the successful implemen-
tation of the Paris Agreement. In the longer term, the IPCC Sixth 
Assessment Report is being designed to also provide input to the 
global stock take process in 2023. Its ability to provide policy rele-
vant assessments on the Paris Agreement would be much enhanced 
by research addressing the issues outlined above.
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